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of the Consent Order mandating acquisition of all water rights
affected by contamination. The Consent Order itself served a public
purpose in trying to assure clean water. Therefore, the City's attempt
to comply with the Consent Order was for the benefit of the public.
The Special Act facilitated the fulfillment of the Consent Order, and
was therefore enacted for a legitimate purpose.
Albahary next argued that the Special Act only permitted the City
to take ground water rights, not easement rights. Because the Special
Act did not mention the word easement, Albahary argued that by
taking easement rights, the City exceeded the express authority of the
Special Act, thus rendering the condemnation ultra vires. Conceding
there was no express language regarding easements in the statute, the
court relied on the traditional view that ambiguous statutes must be
construed to satisfy the legislature's purpose. The court determined
that it was plain from the legislative history that the City was not
limited to the water rights of the property. The court thus held the
City had statutory authority to acquire an easement necessary to
comply with the Special Act's purpose. Therefore, the court allowed
the City to condemn an easement across Albahary's property.
Finally, Albahary argued that the taking was statutorily prohibited
by General Statutes which provide that a municipality may take only a
fee simple interest in private property. The court first stated that
nothing prohibited the legislature from authorizing less than a fee
interest in property. The court next pointed out that the Special Act,
authorizing taking of ground water or rights or interests therein, could
reasonably be interpreted as allowing a condemnation of less than fee
interest. Accordingly, the City's condemnation of the Albahary's
property under the Special Act did not violate the General Statutes.
Kim Shropshire

Middlefield Citizens Action, Inc. v. Middlefield Inland Wetland, Nos.
82372, 85259, 82830, 83209, 1999 WL 195882 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999)
(holding an agency did not receive ex parte information when it
received technical information from its engineer explaining a perched
water table).
White Water Mountain Resorts of Connecticut ("White Water")
runs Powder Ridge Ski Area in the winter. To expand its business to
include summer sports, White Water intended to build a summer
water park adjacent to the ski area.
White Water applied to the Town of Middletown Planning and
Zoning Commission ("Commission") for a special permit to create the
park and the road. During the mandatory public hearings, the
Commission created the special permit's conditions, which primarily
addressed traffic problems. The Commission subsequently approved
the permit.

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

White Water also applied to the town of Middlefield Inland
Wetlands and Watercourse Agency ("Agency") for approval of road
construction activities that would affect wetlands. The Agency held
public hearings concerning the application.
After the hearings and during the deliberation, the Agency
members discussed the drainage calculations for the new road's runoff. The Agency's expert presented the members with a technical
memorandum to explain the dynamics of a perched water table to
help the Agency determine alternative drainage points. The Agency
later granted White Water's application by finding that the road
building activities would not likely impair the water or the natural
resources.
Citizens sued the Agency for accepting ex parte information from
the Agency's engineer after the public hearing period depriving
Citizens of their right to a fair hearing. The court held that receiving
information of a technical nature from an Agency engineer did not
constitute ex parte information.
Madoline Wallace

Reynolds v. City of Bristol, No. CV 970482675, 1999 WL 240064
(Conn. Super. Ct. March 29, 1999) (holding that city's condemnation
proceedings were within city's authority as authorized by special
legislative act).
The City of Bristol ("Bristol") owned and operated a landfill that
began to leak contaminants into surrounding waterways. In 1995, the
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection entered a
Consent Order with Bristol. The Consent Order required that Bristol
test and monitor the contamination and propose plans to remediate
the pollution. The Consent Order also required Bristol to acquire
control over all water rights or interests that were either contaminated
or potentially contaminated.
To assist Bristol in complying with the Consent Order, the
Connecticut General Assembly passed Special Act 96-12 ("Special Act")
allowing municipalities to condemn property rights outside their
corporate limits. In 1997, Bristol's City Council passed a resolution to
comply with the Consent Order.
This resolution authorized Bristol to acquire certain property
rights necessary to comply with the Consent Order. Bristol then
initiated condemnation proceedings against Thomas Reynolds.
Reynolds challenged Bristol's actions, claiming that the condemnation
proceedings exceeded the scope of the Special Act, and were therefore
ultra vires. Both parties stipulated to the relevant facts, and both
moved for summary judgment. The issue was whether Bristol, by
condemning Reynolds' property, acted within the authority granted by
the Special Act.

